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Abstract—VHF Data Broadcast (VDB) currently used by
GBAS has been identified as a potential source of cyber-security
concerns. The use of an alternative datalink providing the
bandwidth for more capable security protocols has therefore
been proposed and demonstrated on the basis of the L-band
Digital Aeronautical Communication System (LDACS). However,
the first demonstration of secure GBAS over LDACS suffered
from some performance degradation. This paper provides an
improved method for secure GBAS over LDACS on the basis of
a rigid performance analysis. Optimized parameters are derived
and evaluated. The results point the way for further performance
enhancements for even more challenging GBAS scenarios.
Index Terms—LDACS, GBAS, cyber security, communication
performance
I. INTRODUCTION
The Ground Based Augmentation System (GBAS) is used to
improve the accuracy of Global Navigation Satellite Systems
(GNSSs) to allow GNSS-based instrument landings of aircraft.
It is based on reference stations with known positions at air-
ports, which generate correction data and integrity parameters
from GNSS measurements. Correction and integrity data are
transmitted to approaching aircraft. Based on this data, aircraft
can calculate their position with precision and confidence in
the integrity of the solution. GBAS enables modern aircraft
to perform safe and secure GNSS-based landings while of-
fering advantages over the Instrument Landing System (ILS)
commonly used today [7].
GBAS requires a datalink to transmit GNSS correction data
to the on-board avionics of the aircraft. As of now, this datalink
is specific to GBAS: The VHF Data Broadcast (VDB). [12]
The VDB datalink has been identified as potentially limiting
the evolution of GBAS: Lee et al. have critized that VDB
can only transmit corrections for the L1 frequency of GPS
satellites, which may be problematic in terms of availability
in equatorial zones [11]. Feuerle et al. and Stanisak et al. have
noted that VDB does not provide sufficient throughput for
correction and integrity data for multiple constellations and
frequencies [8], [16]. Finally, Felux et al. and Garcia et al. have
called attention to the issue that VDB does not provide cyber-
security measures on par with modern wireless systems [6],
[9]. This lead Felux et al. to propose the use of an alternative
datalink for GBAS [9]: The L-band Digital Aeronautical
Communication System (LDACS), which is a general purpose
broadband datalink for aeronautical communication related to
safety and regularity of flight [15].
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Fig. 1: Airborne and ground GBAS/LDACS equipment
GBAS over LDACS was demonstrated by Mäurer et al. in
the MICONAV project1 [12]. The results demonstrated the
general feasibility of GBAS over LDACS. It showed that
the GAST-C2 and GAST-D3 requirements can be satisfied.
In addition to these performance goals, the Timed Efficient
Stream Loss-tolerant Authentication (TESLA) protocol was
used to authenticate GBAS broadcast data demonstrating se-
cure GBAS. However, the result obtained during MICONAV
also revealed the need for a more optimized approach of
integrating GBAS, TESLA security, and LDACS protocols.
This work proposes an improved method for transmitting
TESLA secured GBAS correction data over LDACS result-
ing in overall better performance. The results in this paper
were obtained by analysing the performance of an improved
implementation of the MICONAV demonstration, while using
the actual LDACS latency measurements recorded during the
flight trials.
1Migration towards Integrated COM/NAV Avionics (MICONAV) was a
research project co-funded by the LuFo program of the Federal Republic
of Germany.
2Supporting category I precision approach capability.















Fig. 2: Experimental setup of Mäurer’s demonstration of
GBAS over LDACS. The blue and orange arrows indicate the
reference points at which the LDACS (blue) and secure GBAS
latency (orange) was measured. The applicability of the GAST
latency requirements is indicated in green.
II. MÄURER’S DEMONSTRATION OF GBAS OVER LDACS
GBAS over LDACS was first demonstrated in the
MICONAV project as reported by Mäurer et al. [12] and
Bellido et al. [3]. The main purpose of the GBAS over
LDACS experiment was to demonstrate the ability of LDACS
to provide a secure, broadband datalink for GBAS. For this
purpose a co-located LDACS ground station and GBAS refer-
ence station, as well as a software-based GBAS receiver were
deployed for flight trials in the vicinity of Munich, Germany.
GBAS ground processing in the ground station (Fig. 1b and
1c) generated correction and integrity data from the received
GNSS signals. This data was forwarded to the LDACS ground-
station software. It was then cryptographically authenticated
with the TESLA protocol. The secured GBAS message was
then transmitted to the aircraft via LDACS (Fig. 1a and 1d).
The setup of the experiment is outlined in Fig. 2.
A. Background on TESLA
The use of TESLA for secure GBAS was motivated by its
comparative computational efficiency and and low overhead.
The naı̈ve way to authenticate broadcast packets, would be to
append digital signatures to each packet. However, this would
require the use of public key cryptography. The sender would
have to use its private key to digitally sign each packet and the
recipient would have to to know and use the sender’s public
key to verify the signatures. This leads to two drawbacks:
First, the calculations for generating and verifying a digital
signature are several orders of magnitude more computation-
ally expensive than performing a symmetric operation, such as
generation a Message Authentication Code (MAC). Secondly,
the size of digital signatures is currently in the order of 512b
or 64B, which generates significant overhead. If a MAC were
used, the security overhead could be reduced. Using TESLA
for secure GBAS has therefor the potential to reduce the
computational effort and decrease the amount of security data
overhead.
The general idea behind TESLA is to split time into even
intervals Tint. These time intervals are used to generate a one
way-key chain by assigning a key ki to each interval. The in-
terval’s key is then used to compute a Message Authentication
Code (MAC) for each packet transmitted during this interval.
A formal illustration of this protocol is displayed in Fig. 3.
The MAC of each packet needs to be verified after reception.
The necessary key ki, so far only known to the transmitter, is
sent to all receivers in an interval where it is no longer used
by the transmitter. This interval is called the key disclosure
delay d, measured in Tint intervals. A recipient of a TESLA-
secured packet will therefore (1) receive a packet, (2) buffer
it and, when it received the key after d intervals, (3) verify
its authenticity. Only after step 3 is a TESLA-secured packet
considered securely received.
The TESLA protocol has several requirements to work:
Sender and receivers have to be loosely time synchronized;
they have to have previously agreed upon key derivation,
MAC tag generation, and verification algorithms; and every
new participant has to receive the TESLA parameters in an
authentic manner. [13]
Analysis of Mäurer’s results [12] indicated that the con-
figuration of the TESLA protocol has a profound impact on
the overall performance of secure GBAS over LDACS. The
main TESLA parameters, that are relevant in the context of
this paper are: the interval time Tint, the key disclosure delay
d, and the key ki for generating a MAC of a message m to
be sent in interval i.
B. Performance Impact of TESLA
Mäurer et al. [12] presented two measurement results for
the communication latency of secure GBAS over LDACS. The
results are displayed in Fig. 4a and Fig. 4b. The results repre-
sent latency measurements from two flight experiments called
experiment 01 and experiment 064 with different TESLA
configurations. The benchmark for the results are the GAST-C
and GAST-D GBAS Approach Service Type (GAST) require-
ments, which translate (among others) into communication
latency requirements shown in the figures (yellow line for
GAST-C, green line for GAST-D requirement).
In both results the measured communication latency of
secure GBAS correction data transmitted over LDACS is dis-
played. The communication latency measurement indicates the
cumulative latency introduced by the LDACS datalink (blue
line) for transmitting all fragments of the GBAS message,
without taking the TESLA protocol into account. The authenti-
cation latency measurement also takes the time until the packet
could be verified through TESLA into account (orange line). In
the context of secure GBAS, the GAST requirements have to
be applied to the latter result. Visually comparing the results
of experiment 01 and experiment 06 indicates that fulfilling
the GAST requirements depends on the TESLA configuration
(the orange line should be below the green line) since LDACS
4For consistency we use the numbering introduced in Table 1 of [12]. Only
experiment 01 and 06 are relevant in the context of this paper. Experiment
02 and 03 used similar parameters as experiment 01. Experiment 04 and 05
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Fig. 3: Overview of the TESLA key-chain generation, key use order and construction and content of TESLA-secured data
packets [12]
performance is always sufficient (blue line indicating the
cumulative LDACS latency of fragmented GBAS messages).
C. Theoretical Optimum Performance
What is the minimum latency that can be achieved with
TESLA-secured GBAS over LDACS? Ideally all fragments of
a GBAS message would be authenticated by the first fragment
of the next message. In this case the minimum latency that
could be achieved would be the update interval of GBAS
plus the time required for the transmission of one additional
fragment providing piggy-backed key disclosure.
In experiment 01 the measured 95%-percentile of the
LDACS latency for a GBAS message fragment was 111.99ms.
In experiment 06 the measured 95%-percentile of the LDACS
latency was slightly larger at 147.37ms. Thus, the achievable
minimum latency should be approximately the update rate,
in which GBAS packets are sent, plus the measured 95%-
percentile of the LDACS latency. The update rate for GBAS
packets was 1Hz in experiment 01 and 2Hz in experiment
06, resulting in 1s+ 0.11199s = 1.11199s for experiment 01
and 0.5s + 0.14737s = 0.64737s experiment 06 in the 95%-
percentile, respectively.
A quick inspection of the results in Fig. 4 shows that this
goal has mostly been achieved in experiment 01, but not in
experiment 06 although GBAS correction data is sent twice as
often. Why is that so?
D. Performance Analysis
Mäurer used two different TESLA configuration sets for
the MICONAV demonstration of secure GBAS over LDACS.
The LDACS configuration was not changed between the
experiments: QPSK modulation, coding rate 1/2, resulting in
an approximate ground-to-air data rate of 300 kbit/s [3] of
which less than 50 kbit/s were used for secure GBAS.
Experiment 01 used an interval time Tint = 1s and a key
disclosure delay of d = 1. In this experiment GBAS correction
data was transmitted in five fragments once every second. All
five fragments needed to be received.
Experiment 06 used a more conservative TESLA config-
uration. Tint = 1s remained unchanged, however, the key
disclosure delay was set to d = 2. The GBAS correction
data format was changed to require only two (slightly larger)
fragments, both of which needed to be received. The GBAS
update interval was reduced to send correction data twice per
second.
The analysis of Mäurer’s results revealed the following
issues with these configuration sets:
1) Tint was too long: A problem with these parameter
choices was, that a time interval of Tint = 1s already ap-
proaches the GBAS GAST-D data update interval requirement
of 1.5 s [14]. Since the key disclosure delay d is measured in
multiples of Tint, the introduced authentication delay makes it
hard to meet these requirements. Especially if d > 1. Indeed, it
can be seen in Fig. 5 that it is the authentication delay (orange
line) that determines if the GAST-D requirement (green line) is
met, since the contribution of the LDACS radio latency (blue)
remains mostly unchanged. Clearly, Tint should be shorter,
although the concrete value is not obvious, yet.
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(a) Experiment 01 (Tint = 1s, d = 1)
GBAS correction data is transmitted at 1 Hz
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Fig. 4: Measured latency of secured GBAS messages in Mäurer’s demonstration [12].
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(a) Experiment 01: GBAS correction data is transmitted in five
packets once per second. When all five fragments have been received
(the cumulative LDACS latency is shown by the blue line), TESLA
authentication is performed over the time of d = 1 interval of
length Tint = 1s (orange line) . Only after successful TESLA
authentication the data is considered received.
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Latency of full GBAS packet
GBAS and TESLA latency for GBAS packet #1
GBAS and TESLA latency for GBAS packet #2
GBAS and TESLA latency for GBAS packet #3
(b) Experiment 06: GBAS correction data is transmitted in two
packets twice per second. When both fragments have been received
(the cumulative LDACS latency is shown by the blue line), TESLA
authentication is performed over the time of d = 2 intervals of
length Tint = 1s (orange line) . Only after successful TESLA
authentication the data is considered received.
Fig. 5: Analysis of the measured latency of the first secured GBAS messages in Mäurer’s demonstration [12].
2) d was too large: In experiment 06 the key disclosure
delay d was set to d = 2. In combination with Tint = 1s
this lead to an authentication delay of at least Tint = 1s and
up to d · Tint = 2s. Clearly, this allowed only few packets to
satisfy the GAST-D requirement of 1.5s. This is discernible in
Fig. 4b. Setting d to a value greater than 1, can prevent race
conditions between key usage and key disclosure if clocks are
not perfectly synchronized. Since GBAS can obviously use
GNSS as a common time source, this does not apply. Clearly,
d should be set to d = 1.
3) GBAS and TESLA time framing were not aligned:
Both GBAS and TESLA use time intervals to structure their
protocols. These two structures were not aligned in both
experiments, which led to performance degradation. This is
best illustrated looking at the example of Fig. 5a: The first
fragment (blue dot) of the first GBAS message carries the key
for TESLA interval 0. Fragment 2 (shortly after the vertical
dotted line indicating the start of TESLA interval 1) carries the
key for interval 1, allowing the verification of the authenticity
of the first fragment. Fragments 2, 3, 4 and 5, the remaining
parts of the first GBAS message, are signed with the key of
interval 1, and can therefore only be verified with the key
of interval 2. That is, the message cannot be accepted until
the start of the next interval, although all fragments of the
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(a) Experiment 01 (optimized configuration: Tint = 750ms, d = 1)
GBAS correction data is transmitted at 1 Hz
GAST-D requirement fulfilled.
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Fig. 6: Latency of secured GBAS messages using the optimized configuration sets.
first GBAS message have been received after 380ms. At time
997ms the first fragment of the second GBAS message is sent,
which is still in TESLA interval 1. Only after the start of
the second TESLA interval, when fragment 2 of the second
GBAS message is sent, the key for the fragments of the first
GBAS message becomes available. This fragment is received
at time 1222ms. This is also the cumulative latency of the
first GBAS message accrued at this time. In experiment 06
the misalignment is even worse, since the key of the previous
message is only disclosed in the last fragment of the following
message as shown in Fig. 5b. Clearly, the time intervals of
GBAS and TESLA could have been better aligned to avoid
changing the TESLA interval during the transmission of the
GBAS message. Ideally, the TESLA interval should change
between GBAS messages.
4) Cryptography overhead can be reduced: In addition to
optimizing the TESLA timing parameters, the cryptography
algorithm used to generate the MACs could also be improved.
Mäurer [12] used the blake2b algorithm from python3’s hash-
lib library [1]. The blake2b algorithm uses a 64B key, a 16B
salt value, and produces a 64B MAC digest. This results in
144B overhead. This overhead can be reduced using more
suitable algorithms, such as blake2s, which uses a 32B key, a
8B salt value, and produces 32B MAC digests. An alternative
way to reduce the overhead is to combine HMAC [10] with
hashes from suitable hash-families, e.g. SHA-3 [4] or SHAKE
[2]. Assuming a minimum key size of 16B, the German
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI)
recommends a minimum message MAC tag size of 12B [5].
Thus, taking this into account, it is reasonable to use 16B key
+ 12B tag, or 16B key + 16B tag, resulting in 28B or 32B
minimum overhead, respectively, for each key and MAC tag
applied to a message.
III. IMPROVED METHOD FOR GBAS OVER LDACS
In the previous section four recommendations have been
derived for the improvement of the secure GBAS protocol:
• Tint should be short: Tint  1.5s
• d should be set to d = 1
• TESLA intervals should change between GBAS messages
• Cryptographic functions requiring smaller keys and re-
sulting in smaller MAC tags should be used
The first and the third recommendations are related to each
other, since they allow to derive an optimal TESLA interval
time Tint: The optimal value for Tint is shorter than the largest
time gap between the last fragment of the previous message
and the first fragment of the next message. This ensures, that
the first fragment of the next packet will always disclose the
key for all fragments of the previous GBAS message. Making
Tint even smaller results in no further improvement, since only
completely reassembled GBAS messages can be used.
This approach resulted in the following configuration sets:
Experiment 01: In this experiment the maximum duration
of the gap between two GBAS messages was measured to be
756ms. Thus, the TESLA interval length was set to the slightly
smaller value of Tint = 750ms, and the key disclosure delay
to d = 1 intervals.
Experiment 06: Following the same approach, the TESLA
interval length was set to Tint = 300ms, and the key
disclosure delay to d = 1 intervals.
The improved TESLA configuration sets were evaluated
using the GBAS messages recorded during Mäurer’s demon-
stration. The recorded GBAS messages were processed by the
improved TESLA protocol. Instead of sending the messages
over an actual LDACS link, the latency measured in the
flight trials was used. This approach could be used, because
the introduced improvements of the TESLA protocol did not
change the size or sending pattern of the GBAS fragments i.e.
the LDACS packets. The improved cryptography algorithms
were not used, to avoid changing messages sizes.
IV. RESULTS
The result of the application of the improved method to ex-
periment 01 is presented in Fig. 6a. The mean TESLA latency
is 1105.44ms and the 95%-percentile latency 1113.97ms. For
comparison, the non-optimized mean latency was 1219.52ms,
and 1287.96ms in the 95%-percentile. The 95%-percentile
was, thus, improved by 15.62% and is now even closer to
the estimated optimum latency of 1111.99ms.
The result of the application of the improved method to
experiment 06 is presented in Fig. 6b. For d = 1 and
Tint = 300ms, experiment 06’s mean latency is 617.94ms
and the 95%-percentile latency 632.98ms. The original la-
tency measured in [12], was 1932.67ms in the mean, and
2596.76ms in the 95%-percentile. The optimized latency is
therefore improved by 410.24% in the 95%-percentile and
close to the estimated optimum latency of 647.37ms.
V. DISCUSSION
The evaluation of the proposed improved method for secure
GBAS indicates, that all issues identified in the analysis
of Mäurer’s secure GBAS demonstration could be resolved.
Indeed, the results show, that it is possible to configure TESLA
in such a way, that near optimal performance can be achieved.
Although not evaluated, the potential reduction in security
overhead of the improved method is also easily estimated: The
originally used hash function blake2b required 64B key and
16B salt input values and produced a 64B message digest. This
144B security overhead can be reduced using HMAC [10] with
hashes on the basis of SHA-3 [4] or SHAKE [2] to a 16B key
and a 16B message digest. For a typical 1000B GBAS packet
this would reduce the security overhead from 14,4% to 3,2%,
which is a welcome improvement.
The results also provide an outlook on the possibilities
of securing GBAS with the TESLA protocol. Considering
the estimated theoretical optimal performance of GBAS over
TESLA, and that 1 Hz data updates are only the current GBAS
use case, the results for experiment 01 indicate only what
can be achieved today. However, if GBAS correction data
for additional GNSS frequencies and constellations is added,
as desired by the GBAS community, this would increase the
number of packets and thus reduce latency even further. This
has already been demonstrated in experiment 06. In summary,
more demanding TESLA secured GBAS via LDACS scenarios
can be supported with even better performance.
VI. CONCLUSION
GBAS over LDACS was first demonstrated by Mäurer
in the MICONAV project. The analysis of the results in-
dicated several possible points of refinement. In particular,
the configuration of the TESLA authentication protocol has
been identified as a major source for performance degrada-
tion. The objective of this paper was thus to propose an
improved method for securing GBAS correction data with
TESLA. Two optimal configuration sets were derived from the
analysis of the original measurements. The enhanced TESLA
configuration was then evaluated on the basis of the original
measurements.
The results of the evaluation indicate, that the improved
configuration parameters provide near-optimal performance.
TESLA induced latency could by reduced by a factor of four
in one case. In addition, the analysis, leading to the enhanced
parameters, points also the way for further improvements for
more challenging GBAS scenarios.
APPENDIX
GAST GBAS Approach Service Type
GBAS Ground Based Augmentation System
GNSS Global Navigation Satellite System
LDACS L-band Digital Aeronautical Communication
System
MAC Message Authentication Code
MICONAV Migration towards Integrated COM/NAV
Avionics
TESLA Timed Efficient Stream Loss-tolerant
Authentication
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